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in favor of older German scholarship. Her treatment of the most recent Slovak study
on an adviser, Katarína Hradská’s 1999 Prípad Wisliceny (The Wisliceny Case), is par-
ticularly superªcial. A similar failure to engage the ªeld more widely also compromises
Tönsmeyer’s concluding thoughts on collaboration.
Finally, Tönsmeyer needs an aggressive editor. She habitually recycles stock
phrases, observations, quotes, and even detailed discussions, sometimes within pages
of each other. Her prose is laden with jargon, coinage, and esoteric usage. The op-
posed terms in her subtitle, furthermore, do not match those in her text.
Despite these and other problems, this is a useful book. It is the most detailed ac-
count yet available of the German advisers. Tönsmeyer’s notion of the “political every-
day” is intriguing and at its non-antiquarian best—as when she recounts the advisers’
cushy lifestyle or the activism of the workaholic among them—adds texture to our
understanding of German-Slovak interactions. Although I doubt that wartime Slovak
sources will conªrm her conclusions fully, her revisionist argument that Slovakia and
perhaps Germany’s other Danubian allies were more independent than believed may
prove fundamentally correct.
✣ ✣ ✣
Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2003. 295 pp, $23.00.
Reviewed by James J. Wirtz, Naval Postgraduate School
The title of Gil Merom’s theoretical foray into the small-wars literature is only slightly
misleading. His purpose is to explain why militarily powerful democracies fail to
achieve their objectives against weaker opponents, despite the success they enjoy on
the battleªeld. Merom suggests that democracies fail to enforce their will against
weaker adversaries because a gap emerges between state policy and public sentiment
toward the war effort, a gap that widens into a chasm of domestic unrest when govern-
ments attempt to cover up the material, human, and moral costs of war. He suggests
that this unease about the war effort is often concentrated in key segments of soci-
ety—among the media, intellectuals, and the urban middle class, or even within the
military itself. To illustrate his theory, Merom explores the French effort to suppress
the Algerian Front for National Liberation, the Israeli punitive expedition into Leba-
non in the 1980s, and the U.S. experience in Vietnam.
Merom’s analysis is a signiªcant contribution to the literature on democracy and
war and a convincing description of the relationship among the elements of the
“Clausewitzian Trinity” (the people, the army, and the state). He demonstrates that
despite the commitment of national prestige, blood, and treasure, segments of demo-
cratic societies make their own assessments of the costs and beneªts of conºict. When
the tactics used are considered morally reprehensible (as with France’s conduct of the
Algerian war) or casualties are deemed too high (Israel’s war in Lebanon), or when
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government policy and ofªcials are viewed as disingenuous (the U.S. experience in
Vietnam), vocal segments of society begin to speak out against the war. Soldiers are
among the ªrst to make this assessment: Merom persuasively shows that Israeli ofªcers
and rank and ªle resisted political demands for brutality in southern Lebanon and
were angered by the way elected ofªcials hid their plans from the Israeli public. Sur-
prisingly, Merom ªnds that resistance to national policy is not necessarily linked to
the number of casualties suffered by either side in the conºict. When people judge
that the cause is just, democracies shrug off the deaths of innocent civilians and their
own soldiers. The cost of conºict alone does not spur resistance to war. Instead, pro-
test movements reºect a more fundamental judgment by individuals about whether
the objectives at stake are really worth the cost. People tolerate casualties as long as
they believe the deaths and injuries are necessary.
Merom’s work is compelling, but it might be too theoretically constrained to cap-
ture the phenomenon of defeat in small wars. One might argue that the category of
events he discusses—”democratic defeat in small wars”—is arbitrary. The French de-
feat in Algeria and the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, for example, might be better explained
by a rising tide of nationalism and anti-colonialism that swept the world following
World War II. Alternatively, the U.S. defeat in Vietnam might have had more to do
with the willingness of the Soviet Union and China to unify Vietnam under Commu-
nist rule by ªghting to the last Vietnamese soldier than with domestic protest against
the war in the United States. All of the “defeats” might be based on a failure of elected
ofªcials to ªnd a way to link success on the battleªeld with a political resolution of the
conºict. Most likely, people rebelled not against the war, but against the prospect of
unending and inconclusive war. Moreover, the paradox of defeat identiªed by Merom
at the outset of his work—that the United States, based on any measure of national
power, should have succeeded in Vietnam—really does not apply to the Israeli and
French cases, which featured more evenly matched antagonists.
Additionally, Merom might have done a better job of highlighting a key ªnding
that topples a straw man he sets up about the ability of democracies to conduct coun-
terinsurgency. Common explanations for failures to suppress insurgency—that demo-
cratic governments cannot act brutally enough or devise an effective military strat-
egy—are not supported by the evidence. Democracies had the battleªeld situation
well in hand in the cases he surveys, but citizens decided that national objectives were
simply not worth the effort. Eventually, democratic processes turned this sentiment
into policy. One could also argue that the same political dynamics that affected U.S.
and French policymakers inºuenced the decision by Soviet leaders in 1986 to cut their
losses in Afghanistan, suggesting that his theory applies to dictatorships as well. These
alternative explanations for the events in question are prompted not by any funda-
mental failing on Merom’s part but by his highly provocative analysis.
Although How Democracies Lose Small Wars was intended to be an effort at the-
ory building, the book is of great current policy signiªcance. It describes a signiªcant
constraint on the ability of democracies to ªght small wars and helps us understand
why the United States and its coalition partners avoided a debilitating public backlash
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against the series of small wars they successfully prosecuted after the end of the Cold
War (the ªrst Gulf War, interventions in the Balkans, and the invasion of Iraq). As
with much academic writing, however, Merom’s dense and poorly edited prose, his ef-
fort to position his theory in the existing literature, and his preoccupation with dem-
onstrating the theoretical importance of his ªndings all but guarantee that no policy-
maker will ever read his book.
✣ ✣ ✣
Thomas M. Nichols, Winning the World: Lessons for America’s Future from the Cold
War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.
Reviewed by Derek Leebaert, Georgetown University
Unlike all that went before, U.S. supremacy during the second half of the twentieth
century was not a cumulative imperial darkening of the sun. It instead was the recog-
nition by Europeans, Japanese, and other allies of the plain facts of international life.
Britain’s global role in the nineteenth century had been consciously established,
whereas U.S. political, military, and industrial preeminence arose rather haphazardly.
The U.S. position derived more from economic prowess, technology breakthroughs,
and Hollywood’s depiction of the American dream than from any expansionist yearn-
ings in Washington. The optimistic, high-energy democracy found itself having to
settle a problem, not build itself a monument.
What the United States undertook after the Second World War had at the outset
neither a name nor a frame of reference. In retrospect, we may call it the preservation
of a liberal world order—a loose term for constitutionalism, resistance to aggression,
and cooperation as much as possible rather than coercion. Thereafter, however, the
United States too often shamefully indulged dictatorships (think of Iraq), the recur-
ring blunders of analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the aborted CIA
operations hidden behind codeword clearances, and the boondoggles of businessmen
and professors abetted by tax dollars from grocers and stevedores. Too often the indi-
viduals who lined up against the threat from 1946 to 1991—not only mischief makers
such as Senator Joseph McCarthy and J. Edgar Hoover but all those enthusiasts who
delighted in emergency and presumed to ªne-tune the world—were unfortunate
companions in a great cause.
To be faced with real danger by totalitarian forces in parallel with several concur-
rent technological revolutions decade after decade inevitably made crisis a way of life.
Increasingly, quotidian activities were intruded on by politics, from which Americans
have historically sought to keep their distance as a necessary condition of well-being.
Yes, the Cold War was a struggle for hearts and minds—in the end, a struggle for sin-
cere belief and the willingness that ºows from it. But it nurtured an acute awareness
and suspicion of decisions too often rationalized by “national security.” Among the
public, the Cold War years fostered not only resentment toward often-hypocritical al-
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